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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
On appeal, Mr. Parvin asserts that the district court erred when, after an 
evidentiary hearing held on remand from the Idaho Court of Appeals, it denied him post-
conviction relief. Specifically, he maintains that he established both deficient 
performance and prejudice with respect to his claim that his attorney failed to ensure 
that the Idaho Criminal Rule 35 ("Rule 35") relief that he was originally given was 
retained when that attorney failed to take any steps to have the Rule 35 motion ruled 
upon while the district court still had jurisdiction. 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State raises a number of arguments, none of which 
is well-taken, and only three of which merit a reply. One is that Mr. Parvin has not 
properly raised a statutory ineffective assistance of counsel claim because he failed to 
cite to Idaho Code § 19-852 in his Petition or his Appellant's Brief. A second is that 
Mr. Parvin cannot show deficient performance based on the State's claim that he 
unilaterally amended his Petition via testimony at a supplemental evidentiary hearing 
following remand and he cannot show deficient performance under the State's 
formulation of a "new" claim. A third is that Mr. Parvin cannot show prejudice because 
he could not have obtained Rule 35 relief without a contested hearing as, according to 
the State, a district court's decision on a Rule 35 motion for leniency constitutes a 
resentencing, which pursuant to the State's interpretation of the terms of his plea 
agreement, was not permitted without the input of the victims and their families. 
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This Reply Brief is necessary in order to dispose of the above-listed arguments. 
Other arguments advanced by the State do not require responses, as they are 
adequately addressed in the Appellant's Brief. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Parvin's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference. 
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ISSUES 
1. May Mr. Parvin obtain post-conviction relief if he failed to cite to Idaho 
Code § 19-852 in his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief or his Appellant's Brief? 
2. May the State amend a petitioner's post-conviction petition on appeal? 
3. Does a decision on a Rule 35 motion for leniency constitute a "resentencing," 




A Petitioner Need Not Cite To Idaho Code § 19-852 In Order To Obtain Post-Conviction 
Relief Based On A Claim Of Statutory Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
The State's first basis for opposing Mr. Parvin's appeal from the denial of his 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is that, when a Sixth Amendment basis for an 
ineffective assistance claim does not lie, it is necessary that a petitioner specifically cite 
Idaho Code § 19-852 in his petition, appellant's brief, or both in order to obtain relief. In 
opposing Mr. Parvin's claim, the State argues, 
At no time below, however, did Parvin ever assert that his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim in relation to his Rule 35 motion was based on 
the deprivation of his statutory right to counsel. (See,~, R., pp.?3, 81; 
see also Tr.) Parvin likewise failed to invoke a statutory right in his 
appellant's brief. (See generally Appellant's brief.) Under Idaho Code § 
19-4903, petitioners for post-conviction relief are required to "specifically 
set forth the grounds upon which the application is based." Because 
Parvin failed to specifically set forth (or even generally set forth) the 
deprivation of a statutory right as the basis for his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, no such claim should be considered on appeal. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7.) The State then argued that, even if the issue had been 
preserved, precedent provides no basis for believing that post-conviction relief should 
be "afforded . . . to a defendant seeking a routine reduction of sentence without the 
submission of any new evidence or argument." (Respondent's Brief, p.?) 
Aside from quoting a portion of Idaho Code § 19-4903 setting forth a requirement 
that a petitioner provide the grounds upon which an application for post-conviction relief 
is based, the State provides no authority for its argument that a petitioner must cite to 
Idaho Code § 19-852 in order to pursue a claim of statutory ineffective assistance of 
counsel. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-8.) The State's partial quotation of Idaho 
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Code § 19-4903 ignores the last sentence of that statute, which provides, "Argument, 
citations, and discussions of authorities are unnecessary." I.C. § 19-4903. 
The fatal problem, however, with the State's argument is that it ignores the Idaho 
Court of Appeals' earlier opinion remanding this matter for the hearing from which this 
appeal follows, including its conclusion that "[t]here is no question that Parvin has raised 
a plausible claim of ineffective assistance of counselL]" and that "Parvin correctly notes 
that he had received counsel pursuant to I.C. § 19-852 for the Rule 35 motion, and, as 
such, had a statutory right to effective counseL" PalVin v. State, 2012 Unpublished 
Opinion No. 453, pp.3, 4 n.1 (Ct. App. April 30, 2012). 
Under the "law of the case" doctrine, the Court of Appeals' conclusion that 
Mr. Parvin's Petition contains a plausible claim of statutory ineffective assistance of 
counsel under Idaho Code § 19-852 that necessitated remand for a decision on the 
merits cannot be re-litigated in this appeal. See Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 
515-16 (2000) (applying "law of the case" doctrine, which "provides that 'upon an 
appeal, the Supreme Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle 
or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the 
case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court 
and upon subsequent appeal," to final decisions of the Court of Appeals). 
The second problem with the State's argument is that nowhere in his Verified 
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief did Mr. Parvin limit his ineffective 
assistance claim to one under the Sixth Amendment. His claim was that he received 
"Ineffective Assistance of Counsel," with no mention of either the Sixth Amendment or 
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Idaho Code § 19-852. (R., p.73.) Explaining his claim in more detail later in his 
Petition, Mr. Parvin wrote, 
Petitioner's attorney was deficient in failing to take action to ensure that 
the District Court took timely action on the clearly meritorious motion to 
reduce sentence. This failure resulted in a delay which, according to the 
Court of Appeals, deprived the District Court of jurisdiction. Timely action 
by Petitioner's attorney would have resulted in Petitioner's [sic] receiving 
the just sentence he is entitled to, five to twenty years. 
(R., p.81.) The third problem with the State's argument is that, in his Appellant's Brief, 
Mr. Parvin discussed the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
by quoting Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313 (Ct. App. 1995), a case involving a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a Rule 35 motion. (Appellant's Brief, 
p.7.) The final problem with the State's contention is that it completely ignores the 
Idaho Supreme Court's insistence that Idaho Code § 19-852's "statutory right to counsel 
would be a hollow right if it did not guarantee the defendant the right to effective 
assistance of counsel," with the Court continuing, "We can see no legitimate basis for 
determining whether there has been a violation of the right to effective assistance of 
counsel guaranteed by I.C. § 19-852 differently from determining whether there has 
been a violation of a similar constitutional right." Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 685, 
687 (1995). The Court then went on to note that the requirements for proving ineffective 
assistance of counsel are: (1) establishing deficient performance by counsel, and (2) 
demonstrating prejudice. Id. (citing Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988». 
For all of these reasons, the State's argument that Mr. Parvin's statutory 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not properly before this Court is without merit. 
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II. 
The State May Not Amend A Petitioner's Post-Conviction Petition On Appeal 
The State's next contention is that Mr. Parvin has failed to establish deficient 
performance because 
On remand, Parvin argued that his attorney was deficient, asserting that 
he should have asked the district court to rule on the Rule 35 motion on 
day 120, after filing the motion on day 119, in order to preserve the district 
court's jurisdiction. (Tr., p.12, Ls.12-24.) But that is not what the standard 
requires. 
The district court lost jurisdiction to rule on Parvin's Rule 35 motion 
because it delayed ruling on the motion for more than three months and 
there was no adequate record for its delay, not because trial counsel 
insufficiently nagged the court the day after he filed the Rule 35 motion. 
Because Parvin failed to prove that his counsel was objectively deficient in 
regards to his Rule 35 motion, his claim was correctly denied. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.1 0-11.) 
The key problem with the State's argument is that it takes testimony provided by 
Mr. Parvin at a supplemental evidentiary hearing held following remand, and attempts to 
amend Mr. Parvin's Petition by reference to that testimony. It may seem fairly obvious, 
but Mr. Parvin will note that it is the petitioner who decides what issues to raise in a 
petition for post-conviction relief, not the State. See I.C. § 19-4903 ("The application 
shall identify the proceedings in which the applicant was convicted . . . [and] shall 
identify all previous proceedings, together with the grounds therein asserted, taken by 
the applicant to secure relief from his conviction or sentence.") (emphasis added). Even 
assuming that Mr. Parvin's testimony was an attempt to amend his Petition, he would 
have needed leave from the district court to do so. See I.C. § 19-4906(a) ("The court 
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may make appropriate orders for amendment of the application .... ") (emphasis 
added). 
The other problem with the State's argument is that, even assuming the State 
may amend Mr. Parvin's Petition on appeal (or may argue that Mr. Parvin unilaterally 
did so via his testimony at the supplemental evidentiary hearing), a review of that 
testimony in context reveals that Mr. Parvin and post-conviction counsel were merely 
providing information as to his defense attorney's total failure to precipitate timely action 
on the Rule 35 motion, which constituted deficient performance. The testimony cited to 
by the State, when the testimony immediately preceding and following the cited portion 
of the transcript is included,1 reads as follows: 
[Counsel:] And through the procedural history, which this Court has 
taken judicial notice of - it's a long history - the long and the short of it is 
at one point the Court of Appeals held Judge Mortitt had lost jurisdiction 
because he did not act upon the Rule 35 in a timely matter [sic]; is that 
correct? 
[Mr. Parvin:] That's correct. 
[Counsel:] Now, we've talked about the fact that you requested 
Mr. Onanubosi to file the Rule 35? 
[Mr. Parvin:] Yes. 
[Counsel:] And basically [it] was filed 119 days before [sic] the judgment 
was issued, correct? 
[Mr. Parvin:] Correct. 
[Counsel:] And then, that one additional day that Judge Morfitt still had 
remaining jurisdiction, to the best of your knowledge, Mr. Onanubosi did 
not come in and speak to Judge Morfitt about making a ruling on that day 
while he still had jurisdiction; is that right? 
[Mr. Parvin:] Not that I'm aware of, no. 
1 The portions of the transcript not cited by the State are italicized. 
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[Counsel:] And to the best of your knowledge or to your opinion, if the 
Rule 35 had been filed in a more timely fashion, and had Mr. Onanubosi 
followed up and made sure that Judge Morfitt ruled while he still had 
jurisdiction, is it your opinion that, but for that, the relief that you requested 
would have been granted and been valid? 
[Mr. Parvin:] Yes, I believe it would have been. 
[Counsel:] Okay. And but for the fact that it was not ruled upon 
because your counsel failed to make sure that Judge Morfitt ruled in a 
timely manner, the Court lost jurisdiction? 
[Mr. Parvin:] That is correct. 
(Tr., p.12, LA - p.13, L.12 (emphases added).) In proper context, then, it is clear that 
Mr. Parvin was not attempting to modify his sole post-conviction claim, namely, that his 
attorney was ineffective for failing to take steps to ensure that his Rule 35 motion was 
decided before the district court lost jurisdiction. 
In light of the complete lack of authority for the State's argument, as well as the 
lack of any indication that Mr. Parvin sought - let alone received the district court's 
permission - to amend his Petition via testimony at a supplemental evidentiary hearing 
on remand, Mr. Parvin asserts that the State's argument is without merit. 
III. 
A Decision On A Rule 35 Motion For Leniency Does Not Constitute A "Resentencing," 
Requiring A Hearing 
The last of the State's argument that necessitates a reply is that Mr. Parvin 
cannot establish prejudice because "under the peculiar facts of this case, the district 
court could not grant Parvin Rule 35 relief absent a contested hearing" because one of 
the conditions of the plea agreement was "that all of Parvin's victims, including their 
immediate family members, would be present and permitted to testify at sentencing." 
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(Respondent's Brief, pp.14-15 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). The State 
completed its argument by explaining, 
To resentence Parvin without granting the victims and their families the 
right to be present and to testify would be a breach of Parvin's plea 
agreement. Parvin's plea agreement required the district court to hold a 
contested hearing before it could reduce his sentencelJ and upon holding 
that contested hearing the district court did not grant Parvin's motion. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.15 (emphasis added).) 
The key problem with the State's argument is that it ignores the plain text of 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35, which, in relevant part provides, "Motions to correct or modify 
sentence under this rule ... shall be consider~d and determined by the court without 
the admission of additional testimony and without oral argument, unless otherwise 
ordered by the court in its discretion." I.C.R. 35(b) (emphasis added); see also LC.R. 
43( c) ("A defendant need not be present in the following situations unless otherwise 
ordered by the court ... (4) At a reduction of sentence under Rule 35."); I.C. § 19-2503 
("For the purpose of judgment, if the conviction is for a felony, the defendant must be 
personally present"). In light of the clear statutes and rules on the matter, a decision to 
grant or deny a Rule 35 motion for leniency is not a "resentenc[ing]" necessitating a 
hearing, let alone one at which any victims and the defendant need be present. 
Because a district court's decision to grant or deny a Rule 35 motion for leniency 
is not a "resentenc[ing]," the State's argument that Mr. Parvin could not prove prejudice 
2 Mr. Parvin will not address this portion of the State's argument, as the State cites to 
nothing in the record to indicate that the plea agreement included a requirement that a 
contested hearing be held prior to the district court ruling on a Rule 35 motion for 
leniency. See I.A.R. 35(b)(6) ("The argument shall contain the contentions of the 
respondent with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the transcript and record relied upon.") 
(emphasis added). 
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because the granting of his motion required a hearing at which the victims and their 
family members were present is not well-taken. 3 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, and in his Appel/ant's Brief, Mr. Parvin 
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's judgment of dismissal as 
to his Rule 35 claim, and remand this matter for entry of an order reinstating the district 
court's order granting Rule 35 relief, in which it reduced his sentence from life, with ten 
years fixed, to a unified sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed. 
DATED this 2nd day of April, 2014. 
J. HAHN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
3 To the extent that the State may be advancing an argument that, under the statutory 
and constitutional provisions granting rights to Idaho crime victims, crime victims have 
special rights in Rule 35 proceedings not provided to a criminal defendant, such an 
argument should be rejected on due process grounds. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 
U.S. 470 (1973) (one-sided procedural rules that benefit the state violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause). 
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